Perry in this journal draws on two new sources to challenge claims by Dalziel (2002) and Peetz (2005) about relatively weak labour productivity growth in New Zealand after the introduction of its Employment Contracts Act (ECA) in 1991. While new data raise further research questions, they do not overturn our original conclusions. Whether the ECA contributed to higher labour input growth compared to Australia, it failed to improve labour productivity growth.
Introduction

Debates about Australia's Workplace Relations Amendment (Work Choices) Act 2005
rekindled interest in whether New Zealand's similarly depicted Employment Contracts Act 1991 (ECA) produced any positive impact on aggregate labour productivity in that country. Dalziel (2002, p. 42) concluded that 'the introduction of the ECA appears to have marked the end of a long period of strong comparability between New Zealand and Australian labour productivity growth, to New Zealand's great disadvantage'. Peetz (2005) included Dalziel's analysis in the evidence for his conclusion that 'there is no inherent relationship between the form of coverage [individual contracting or collective bargaining] and growth in productivity' (p. 49). More recently, Perry (2006) argues two new data sources for comparing Australian and New Zealand economic performance do not support our claims. Here we reply that the new data sources raise further research questions, but do not overturn our original conclusions.
The Total Economy Database
The first new source is the Total Economy Database provided by The Conference Board and Groningen Growth and Development Centre (TCB/GGDC), which presents time series on key variables for 124 countries.
1 Early values for New Zealand annual hours in that dataset are created using Australian trends. This makes them unsuitable for comparing the two countries, but an alternative is available based on a series of average weekly labour hours published by the New Zealand Department of Labour from 1957 to 1986 (Fletcher, 1990 ).
This alternate series has been used in Figure 1 , which otherwises uses the TCB/GGDC data to depict labour productivity in New Zealand and Australia. The figure also includes a third line,
showing New Zealand's labour productivity after 1978, rebased to equal Australia's value in 1978. The impact of using the Department of Labour data to calculate New Zealand total labour hours turns out to be negligible, and so four points made by Perry (2006) are immediately apparent in Figure 1: 1. New Zealand experienced lower labour productivity growth than Australia after the introduction of the ECA in 1991.
2. The fall in New Zealand's relative performance after 1991 is better explained by an exceptional performance by Australia (following, inter alia, a shift from awards to collective 'enterprise' bargaining) than by a deterioration in New Zealand's labour productivity growth.
3. New Zealand also experienced periods of lower average labour productivity growth than Australia prior to 1991.
4. If the two series are rebased to a common value in 1978 then (after dipping during the centralised Accord) Australia's relative labour productivity passed New Zealand's in the midst of the ECA period rather than in 1991 as per the analysis of Dalziel (2002) . 
The Measured Productivity Data
The second new data source is a Statistics New Zealand ( Perry suggests 'given that Australian labour productivity growth was relatively high during these years, it is very likely that New Zealand's labour productivity growth was also relatively high during the ECA years' (p. 371). Perry's brave conjecture cannot be tested until the New Zealand series is extended to earlier years, but in the meantime the evidence is not supportive: the data in Figure 3 imply that labour productivity growth between 1987/88 and 1990/91 was 12.7 per cent in New Zealand, but only 5.9 per cent in Australia. It is possible that New Zealand was engaged in labour productivity catch-up in the final years of collective bargaining, which did not continue after the shift to individual contracting in 1991.
The results might also be reconciled by divergent trends in the countries' non-measured sectors. Drew (2007, p. 27) 
Concluding remarks
Perry has made an interesting contribution but it would be unfortunate if it led to a view that New Zealand's productivity has been strong in recent times. The TCB/GGDC Total Economy Database has also been analysed by David Skilling, Chief Executive of the business-funded New Zealand Institute, who notes that the entire trans-Tasman per capita income gap can be explained by the difference in the two countries' labour productivity. Skilling comments:
About two thirds of New Zealand's economic growth generated since 1990 has been due to growth in hours worked, as unemployment has reduced and labour force participation has risen.
Only one third has been due to labour productivity growth. New Zealand's labour productivity growth rate of 1.0% over the past 15 years is in the bottom quartile of OECD countries. Indeed, New Zealand has only maintained its relative income position in the OECD since 1990 by working more hours to almost exactly offset its declining relative labour productivity level. This is not a sustainable way to proceed. [2007, pp. 1-2] New Zealand's move in 1991 from an industrial relations system based on collective bargaining to one based on individual contracting may have contributed to that increase in labour inputs over the last 15 years, but it did not help address New Zealand's long-standing problems with labour productivity growth relative to other countries in the OECD. 
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